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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Analogy in moral deliberation: the role of imagination
and theory in ethics
B Smith
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J Med Ethics 2002;28:244–248
This paper develops themes addressed in an article by Eric Wiland in the Journal of Medical Ethics
2000;26:466–8, where he aims to contribute to the debate concerning the moral status of abortion,
and to emphasise the importance of analogies in moral argument. In the present paper I try to secure
more firmly a novel understanding of why analogy is an essential component in the attempt to justify
moral beliefs. I seek to show how analogical argument both encapsulates and exercises the notions of
rationality and imagination and that the construction, development, and comparison of analogies fun-
damentally underpins ethical argument. In so doing, it enables us to adopt imaginative and ethically
illuminating perspectives but in a manner that does not relinquish any claims to intellectual rigour. I
present a critique of a brand of “moral particularism” by showing how it cannot, if construed in a cer-
tain way, adequately conceive of how we use analogies and imaginary cases in ethics. Although such
a particularism is thus impotent with regard to ethical debate, I show that the wider motivation behind
particularism that can be extracted is of clear relevance and importance to medical practitioners.
This paper is a development of themes addressed in arecent article in the Journal of Medical Ethics.1 In it EricWiland seeks both to contribute to the ongoing debate
concerning the moral status of abortion, and also to raise
awareness of the significance of analogy in moral argument.
My concern in the present article will be primarily guided by
this second aspect, although I hope that implications that are
more directly relevant to themoral status of abortion will stem
from these considerations. I will argue that the procedure of
analogical reasoning is essentially linked to our inquiries into
ethical issues both in a theoretical way and also with regard to
concrete cases of the day-to-day demands and requirements of
moral reflection, judgment, and argument. I claim that the
construction, development, and comparison of analogies
underpin the manner in which we enter into ethical debate
and—reminding us that theoretical or “philosophical” ethics
remains inalienably attached to its more normative
applications—“are the stuff out of which normative moral
philosophy is made”.2
I wish to consider the rise of contemporary “moral particu-
larism” with reference to the procedures of analogical reason-
ing, and to the status and role of imaginary cases in ethics.My
aim will be to urge practitioners to recognise the importance
of analogy and the imaginary case when applied to ethical
deliberation; however, in so doing, I aim also to secure the
belief that in approaching moral issues and moral argument
from an analogical and “imaginative” point of view,we are not
relinquishing any claim to intellectual rigour.
In the second section I outline the manner in which moral
particularism emphasises the importance of the particular
case in ethical deliberation, and also explain why it is hostile
to the use of imaginary cases in ethics. The third section
examines the status of analogy in moral argument, and
secures the belief that analogies with or without imaginary
elements help nurture ourmoral sensitivities. The final section
brings together the reasons why analogical argument man-
ages to successfully unite our “imaginative” capacities with an
adherence to the canons of rationality.
Moral particularism is an influential movement in contem-
porary moral philosophy, that largely can be characterised as a
reaction against the previous dominance and apparently
bloated influence of the role of principles in moral thinking. If
we understood moral particularism as a mere rejection of
principles, then it could rightly be considered as radical in the
extreme. What motivates particularism, however, is rather a
hostility to the manner in which agents tend to deliberate
about a particular moral case as though it must be considered
always and only with reference to a relevant principle. For
example, we know that a person was, is or will be wrong to lie
because of our adherence to the moral principle that it is
“always wrong to lie”. The moral particularist complains that
this “intellectual” way of reaching a moral conclusion can
serve to obscure the potential complexity of the particular case.
Thus, it may be a morally relevant consideration to take into
account that the particular lie in question may be addressed to
the sort of people who are easily offended by others not liking
their new hairstyles. This particular sort of sensitivity on the
part of this person may function as a reason in this instance to
lie about whether or not one has a liking for the new hairdo.
On other occasions, with different people, in different
contexts, the moral features of a case may function differently.
The particularist complaint is that seeking to justify a moral
judgment by appeal to abstract and general principles will
potentially miss the important aspects that pertain to a given,
particular, moral state of affairs. The moral particularist
continues that considerable moral harm can be brought about
by the following of abstract principles that do not and cannot
take into account the peculiarities of any individual moral cir-
cumstance.
One prominent moral particularist, Jonathan Dancy,3 urges
us to inspect each moral circumstance on its own merit, and
formulate our judgment on the basis of what each case will
demand without looking to principles, or how we have judged
on “similar” occasions in the past:
one’s main duty, in moral judgement, is to look really
closely at the case before one. Our first question is not
“Which other cases does this one best resemble?”, but
rather “What is the nature of the case before us?”4
Moral particularism can be understood as propounding a
“case-by-case” methodology in dealing with moral questions,
and there is thus a sense in which particularism could be
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regarded as an appropriate method by which to approach
extremely complex or perhaps unprecedented ethical cases. To
regard it thus, however, immediately gives rise to at least two
significant difficulties. On the one hand, to consider it as any
method at all would be a misunderstanding; moral particular-
ism can only urge us to avoid the inappropriate conceptual
and logical impositions that have been placed upon ethical
thinking by the previous dominance of moral systems. Moral
particularism says to us that we ought to look really carefully
at the case at hand, be sensitive to the complex and peculiar
characteristics that make up the situation, and not artificially
situate a given case in the light of other cases. I assume that so
construed, these warnings would be considered welcome by
most. However, the notion that particularism is able to offer
anything beyond such cautionary constraints is methodologi-
cally unintelligible; for particularism to describe—positively—
the method by which we ought to approach a moral case
would mean it behaves in just that way that it considers
wrong. The second difficulty that immediately presents itself,
and linked to the first, is that over the alleged status of moral
cases as “isolated”. Particularism complains that the “moral
shape” of a certain state of affairs cannot be predicted from
how other moral shapes have been produced in the past, and
so each case ought to be treated as if it were “isolated”. The
lack of precedent cannot be amended for, according to the
particularist, by judging a certain way about the case in a
manner “logically consistent” with other putatively similar
cases; to do so would, I presume, employ a decision procedure
about a moral case that is based upon purely non-moral
considerations—those concerned with the mere preservation
of “logical consistency”—for example. The moral particularist
is hostile to the deployment of moral principles that are con-
text unfriendly; principles whose abstraction and generalis-
ability subsume moral cases regardless of the peculiarities of a
given case. However, this appears as rather implausible to the
extent that it is just a fact about our moral practice that we do
compare and contrast cases.
An example of an abstract principle could be one embodied
in the Hippocratic tradition; “preserve human life”, say. The
particularist might be sceptical as to the moral efficacy of such
a principle because it can come to be employed purely in a
quantitative fashion (relating to the length of life), and to the
exclusion or wilful ignorance of the peculiar qualities that per-
tain to individual cases. The particularist will urge a medical
practitioner to firstly consider a case with reference to its con-
text, seeking to extract the moral saliences that are produced
by the elements giving rise to that circumstance, and not
because it falls under a certain principle. Thus the medical
practitioner ought to reflect on how, say, the “preservation of
human life” relates to the other features of a given
case—familial wishes and expectations, or the comparison of
the patient’s “human life” with the “human life” of their
spouse—for example. Such qualities of a case will only be
properly understood, according to the particularist, from the
contextual point of view.Although decisionsmay indeed come
to be totally in accord with an abstract principle, this, if the
medical practitioner heeds the particularist’s strictures, will
not be because one has viewed the individual case from the
point of view of the principle, but instead that that particular
case, after appropriate analysis, demanded a certain decision
in virtue and not in spite of its particular context and special
features.
Particularism is broadly attractive in its call for the detailed
inspections and close analyses of the demands of each moral
case. I am sceptical, however, of the search to justify this
through a notion of the “morally isolated” case, or on the basis
that we ought not to attempt to predict the moral shape of this
case from the behaviour of the moral shape of cases
“elsewhere”. In approaching the issues that emerge here, I
wish to draw upon an article by Jonathan Dancy5 in which he
argues that the role of the imaginary case in ethical delibera-
tion should be considered as limited in the extreme. Dancy
claims that in constructing an imaginary case, we hope that it
will be able to supplement our moral deliberation about an
actual case; deliberation that is lacking in some way or unable
to provide the appropriate resources for judgment or action.
Usually this procedure is undertaken because the actual case
is morally difficult, whereas the imaginary case more easily
lends itself to a clear cut ethical decision. Dancy maintains,
however, that if the imaginary case is to fulfil its role as ethi-
cal guide, then we must know in what particular ways it will
do so, and this knowledge presupposes other knowledge con-
cerning the actual case:
Essentially, we have to make up our minds about the
moral make up of the actual case before we can come to
a view about whether the imaginary case is after all a
reliable guide.6
The point here is that the imaginary case, if it is to function
in the way intended, must depend upon our knowledge of the
actual case; however, this knowledge is precisely that which
the imaginary case is constructed to provide. Dancy thus
considers imaginary cases in ethics not to be ethically illumi-
nating or morally educating. It appears as though a certain
moral particularism would also reject the examination of
analogies, on the grounds that the proposed analogy may well
involve “imaginary” elements and, more fundamentally, that
any comparison between moral cases (imaginary or no) is
already misdirected. I disagree, and would want to argue that
analogies and imaginary cases in ethics are not only useful but
in fact required by moral deliberation, although an appropri-
ately rich account of this “requirement” is considerably
beyond the scope of the present article.
Wiland chooses to examine Judith Thomson’s7 well known
and controversial analogy that attempts to draw a morally rel-
evant comparison between abortion and an imaginary case
involving an unconscious violinist. For those unfamiliar with
this example I, with some risk of oversimplification, para-
phrase the relevant section from Thomson’s article:
You find yourself to be biologically attached to a famous
violinist who is unconscious. He has a fatal kidney condition
and only you have the correct sort of blood type to help. A
group of dedicated music lovers have kidnapped you and
wired-up the violinist’s circulatory system to your own in
order for his blood to be cleansed by your kidneys. A hospital
director explains that although they would have taken meas-
ures to prevent the music lovers from doing this, if they had
known, the fact of the matter is that you are so wired-up. The
director further explains that to break the connection between
you and the violinist would be kill him. Further, the period of
attachment to the violinist will be only for nine months, after
which he should have recovered and both you and he can be
safely separated. All person’s have a right to life (including
unconscious violinists), and although you have right to deter-
mine what occurs in and to your own body, this right is
trumped by a (any) person’s more basic right to life. Thus, you
are morally obligated to resist separation and remain attached
to the violinist so as not to violate his right to life.
From the contemplation of this case, Thomson aims to
extract a certain problematic moral conclusion: that it is mor-
ally required that you assent to an “outrageous” situation.8 The
purpose of the analogy is to demonstrate why the same
outrage is also applicable to a certain attitude toward abortion;
namely, that abortion is always wrong. In proposing this anal-
ogy, Thomson implicitly seeks explanations from those who
resist drawing the same conclusion about two cases that are,
ethically speaking, relevantly similar; and it is just such expla-
nations that have been offered by critics of Thomson’s analogy.
These objections attempt to show why the analogy is weak,
and that there are morally relevant dis-analogies between the
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two cases, and so there would be no reason to suppose that the
same moral outrage should apply equally in each case. Thom-
son presents a certain picture of moral deliberation that
involves the comparison of moral cases and, through the pres-
entation of a morally relevant analogy, challenges proposals to
judge differently when confronted with relevantly similar
situations. That is to say, Thomson implies that nothing but
arbitrary decision will motivate our judging about the cases if
we accept that the analogy is a good one. Of course—as critics
have suggested—the analogy may not be a good one, in which
case Thomson’s proposal would be less than persuasive. For
our purposes, I do not want to rehearse the main objections to
Thomson’s analogy and attempt to construct a better one, if
indeed one is needed. Rather, I aim to emphasise the manner
in which moral particularism cannot accept the analogy for
the simple reason that it is an analogy. I suggest that debating
whether or not Thomson’s analogy is in fact a good one, is an
example of what constitutes one of the most fundamentally
important practices in moral deliberation. Because moral par-
ticularism cannot properly recognise the activity of comparing
moral circumstances and hence rejects the efficacy of
imaginary cases in ethics, it appears to be unable even to enter
into this debate; for this reason I find it to be a severely impo-
tent and unattractive position.
Wiland9 states that although Thomson’s analogy may
contain flaws, we ought to keep in mind what she was trying
to do via the suggestion that there may be a morally relevant
analogy between the case of the unconscious violinist and
abortion. I suggest that analogies can help us to adopt an
ethically illuminating perspective which had previously
remained unoccupied. We can appreciate, via the construction
and analysis of analogy, a novel way to consider an object case.
A natural response to this suggestion may be motivated by it
not seeming to be at all clear what happens after a good anal-
ogy has been drawn;why does or ought it to matter if one case
is or is not analogous to another? It matters because in draw-
ing analogies (and for that matter dis-analogies) we come to
know something about that object case over and above its
existence as an allegedly isolated occurrence; that is, we see
how it relates to other cases and in a way that makes it irrel-
evant whether such cases “actually exist”. This is not to say
that this process is undertaken in order to serve as a scan for
logical inconsistency; if it were merely to do this, then the
particularists would be right to be sceptical of the role of
analogies and imaginary cases in ethics. It is rather, I suggest,
to serve in an ethical capacity itself—beyond or at least along-
side the “purely logical”. The very act of constructing
analogies and their subsequent contemplation, helps mini-
mise our limitations as moral beings and Wiland rightly
claims that the:
whole point of using analogies in moral philosophy is ...
to get us past our self interest, inertia, lack of empathy,
lack of imagination and defensiveness.10
It is this “getting past” or transcending morally dubious
motivations in ethical deliberation that can be achieved by
adopting a different point of view from one’s own. This will
require some imaginative capacity on the part of the agent,
and can occur through the positioning of oneself in the place
of another. However, this repositioning can also take place
through the drawing of analogies between the object case and
other situations. In Thomson’s analogy for instance, previously
unnoticed or obscured moral features of abortion are
potentially clarified or made explicit by the comparison with
another state of affairs; conclusions drawn from that case
involving the unconscious violinist are directly transposable to
the wider case of abortion. Of course, the extent of this “direct
transposition” is the moot point.
One “defect” of Thomson’s analogy, Wiland notes, is that
the case of the violinist is utterly fictitious. The form of this
objection is a common reaction to some notoriously fantasti-
cal examples found within the literature of moral philosophy.
Such examples can themselves be offensive when they are
invoked in order to apparently help us deliberate about an
actual and difficult moral case. In an influential article, G E M
Anscombe11 notes how such “fictitious” moral cases are
typically manufactured with an eye to moral corruption.What
they attempt, however, although with varying degrees of suc-
cess, is to pose the form of the actual moral case in a way that
enables us to adopt a different perspective upon it; it is hoped
that this different perspective will throw moral light upon the
actual case. In order to achieve this, there must be some kind
of common ground uponwhich both the actual and imaginary
case converge. When there is little or no such ground, the
analogy is weak or there is no analogy at all. When this com-
mon ground is extensive, however, it may be so in a morally
pedagogical way. It is the existence of such common ground or
“conceptual convergence” that gives rise to my rejection of the
“morally isolated”. Whilst not suggesting that moral cases,
questions, and dilemmas fall into predetermined kinds I do
want to say that moral states of affairs contain, in a certain
way, implications for other ones. This is to say, that moral cases
have something in common. Although this commonality may
indeed be extremely formal and schematic, it is what in part
allows for their recognition as moral cases at all. The point of
Thomson’s violinist example is thus to try and get us to recog-
nise the circumstance as holding a certain moral import; to
stimulate our ethical thinking through the acknowledgement
that the violinist’s circumstance can inform our ethical
thought about abortion through recognising the moral force
of the implications drawn from the former.
Even when analogies are held to be weak or irrelevant, this
may itself serve an important ethical function. In seeking to
defeat an analogy, by bringing out the dissimilarities between
two cases, we can help foster moral wisdom by being more
informed,morally speaking. Thus, to be in a position to declare
a proposed analogy as weak (or non-existent) presupposes a
certain amount of knowledge concerning that which the
analogous item is weak with regard to. For a person to give
reasons why, for instance, Thomson’s analogy is too fragile is
to affirm certain characteristic moral features of abortion; for
example that, according to such a person, a fetus is in a state
brought about by a voluntary action of the mother, and thus
crucially unlike the state of affairs in Thomson’s example.
Moral knowledge is gained however, when we are brought to
see in what ways and to what extent a proposed analogy is a
good or a bad one. In being brought to see these things,we can
recognise certain moral relevances that were there anyway, but
were obscured or ignored by our short-sightedness or lack of
imagination. So, Thomson’s analogy may (or may not) help us
to supplement our moral sensitivities by enabling us to see
more clearly the ethical status of abortion by bringing out
perhaps previously latent features, such as the moral status of
the unwilled existence of some biological appendage to one’s
body. It is incumbent upon us as moral beings to debate and
analyse proposed analogies and to construct new ones, to
compare them with old ones, and to develop an appropriately
sophisticated understanding of moral cases, which reflects the
often difficult and controversial character of many moral
issues.
Moral particularism, as an ethical project that seeks to
deflate the apparent but unjustifiable force of principles in
moral deliberation, can be given direct application to medical
practice. The relationship held between, say, doctor and
patient is widely thought to be an essential component of
much proper, effective, and lasting treatment, and this aspect
of medical practice can—and perhaps ought—to be given a
particularistic understanding. For instance, the balance
between the obligation of medical practitioners to tell the
truth to their patients and exercising compassion toward
them can perhaps only be optimally achieved via the adoption
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of a particularist approach. Rather than deliberate about a case
only with regard to it being one among many similar cases
that are similar because they fall under some principle, the
particularist will urge that detailed analyses must in the first
instance be carried out so that this patient, and those other
persons significantly involved, can benefit to the maximum
degree. This might, for instance, involve a medical practitioner
advising a particular patient by calling on knowledge gained
from a particularistic analysis—knowing that this patient
would benefit from certain information that would not be
appropriately given to other putatively “similar” patients, or
knowing that this patient’s family arrangements need to be
addressed in a way that differs from other patients. Such
knowledge, so the particularist would argue, can only be
gleaned from a detailed inspection of the particular circum-
stances at hand and, as such, is in important ways different
from knowledge had from the mere situating of this case in
the light of a principle.
What would make for an appropriately sensitive moral
agent is the possession of certain theoretical capacities along-
side and interdependent with a particular sort of imaginative
subtlety. This would allow the construction of analogies whilst
simultaneously allowing for their critical scrutiny and
critique. To know something is a good analogy, takes theoreti-
cal and logical skill; further, we can determine to some
extent—in a factual way—the level of relevant similarity
between items. However, the very construction of analogy
relies on imaginative expertise. Crucially all these elements
are in a significant way mutually dependent upon one
another.
This paper is a call for a certain humility in moral thinking;
humility in the sense that we must recognise that our imagi-
nations are limited—in some of us, disastrously so. Recognis-
ing this will facilitate dialogue and argument to the extent
that it raises awareness of the potential for novel and critical
analogies, that in turn require examination and defence. The
analogies we construct will lead to new and better—as well as
worse—ones, thus helping to generate ongoing ethical discus-
sion. Wiland’s12 development of Thomson’s analogy involving
conjoined twins is an example of this. Readers will be aware of
the relevance and poignancy of this analogy given recent
events in the UK.13
There will always be new analogies to be drawn, and we
must enable our moral beliefs to be examined and criticised by
allowing them to be compared and contrasted with alterna-
tives. Only by having a rich moral imagination, along with the
capability to discern similarities and differences between
cases, will we be able to face the difficult moral states of affairs
with which we will always be presented. This paper is implic-
itly concerned with the justification of moral beliefs. The role
of imagination and analogy combined with rational critique
provides scope for the evaluation of such justification. Moral
particularism ought to be taken seriously for drawing our
attention toward the potentially myopic tendencies of abstract
theorising and the purely “intellectual” approach to ethical
cases. However, we need to supplement particularism so as to
make it flexible enough to accommodate the procedures of
analogical reasoning, and the ability to compare and learn
from different moral cases, imaginary or otherwise.
What I hope to have shown here is that whilst particular-
ism’s critique of the project of “intellectualising” moral cases
is well placed, we must be sceptical of it if the cost of this cri-
tique can only be met by the total rejection of an analogy as
analogy. Of course, if particularism helps us to discern the
relative strengths and weaknesses of proposed analogies then
all to the good. However, what isn’t so good is if any analogy is
deemed inappropriate in virtue of its attempt to compare
cases—actual or otherwise. This paper is not an attempt
merely to suggest that analogous cases are useful in ethical
deliberation. It is also claiming that the role of analogy
construction and evaluation is itself ethically pedagogical
because it embodies a certain comparative activity; the sort of
activity that can help produce more sensitive and subtle moral
understanding.
Deliberation using analogy encapsulates the more attractive
aspects both of particularism and of that which it is reacting
against. Formal similarities are crucial in determining
whether or not a given analogy is strong; for instance, the
unconscious violinist is arguably like a fetus in respect of its
apparent position of “dependence”. But the substantial quali-
ties that pertain to the items drawn together in an analogy can
also be decisive: that a fetus and ex hypothesi the unconscious
violinist will die if separated from the mother or from “you”.
An analogy is a bad one when the similarities said to obtain
between cases are irrelevant in that they bear little or no rela-
tion to the object of deliberation: that two patients are “iden-
tical” in respect of voting for the same party in the last general
election is irrelevant from a diagnostic point of view. Crucially,
the manner in which elements will combine and produce an
analogy of a certain strength cannot be predicted a priori, or
established by the following of abstract rules or the position-
ing of a particular case with reference to a principle. What is
needed in order to achieve the appropriate construction and
evaluation of an analogy is a certain skill on the part of an
agent; a certain insight that comes only with the practice of
engaging in such thinking and “looking”, to use the particu-
larist’s terminology.
Particularism seems appropriate for application to medical
practice in the way that it puts forward a case for sensitive and
detailed examinations of the complex and varied nature of
those features which produce a given case. We have seen,
however, that if particularism is understood in too simple a
way, claiming that the analysis of a medical case must operate
always and only with reference to this case and no other, then
the very procedure of drawing an analogy is denied. I suggest
that on the one hand medical practitioners ought to acknowl-
edge the particularist’s warnings that the mechanistic follow-
ing of abstract principles and rules to the exclusion of the per-
haps unprecedented demands of a given case can lead to
moral harm; on the other hand, there ought to be a serious
attempt to think of cases analogically so that we may gain a
more ethically rounded understanding. This exercise is a com-
parative activity that itself is morally informative. Whether or
not Thomson’s analogy is “good” merely from a logical point
of view, it succeeds in nurturing ethical debate in so far as it
presents a different way of understanding the moral stakes of
abortion. For many other medical cases, seeking to compare
them with other ones, reflecting in light of their similarities
and differences and tracing the moral implications will serve
to inform our moral thought. So, particularism helps us to
investigate the nature of certain medical and ethical cases by
stressing the role of a certain sensitivity; a sensitivity that does
not originate in the mere following of abstract theory, rules or
principles. However, the manner in which moral knowledge
can be delivered by comparative analysis, that form of analysis
embodied in analogical reasoning, should make us wary of the
prospects of any “bald” particularism.
At the very least, we ought to have at least two minimum
expectations: We should want an arena for ethical debate and
argument that is strict and rigorous; the rational and logical
constraints placed upon analogies satisfies this expectation.
We should also want a state of affairs where nothing
potentially relevant is excluded frommoral debate a priori; the
sometimes extraordinarily complex nature of moral cases
means that we will have to approach them with respect to
their own peculiar demands, although we bring to them our
capacity as intelligent and creative creatures; the scope of
potential analogies that can yield considerable moral insight
and foster ethical sensitivity satisfies this expectation. This
article has attempted to focus attention on the important and
intertwining roles that both logic or rationality and imagina-
tion have to play in ethical deliberation; roles that are encap-
sulated and exercised within the form of analogical argument.
Analogy in moral deliberation: the role of imagination and theory in ethics 247
www.jmedethics.com
 on 5 November 2009 jme.bmj.comDownloaded from 
We ought to recognise the significant attractions that
analogies have for ethical debate, and become the sort of
moral beings that can balance our creative imaginations with
the recognition that analogies can be both clarified and made
more powerful by situating themwithin a rational framework.
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